Doer
Well-Known Member
It was never challenged and is now defunct. ObamaTax is constitutional. So, one has nothing to do with the other.
Par for the course.
ZOMG the Founding Fathers Passed Obamacare in 1798
- Thread starter ChesusRice
- Start date
Par for the course.
Doer
Well-Known Member
It is... the 1st Amendment Expression. Trespass and Urinating in public, are unlawful and that has a basis.
Unfortunately, the settled law is that congress can pretty much touch anything with any relation to commerce, spurious or not. There have been myriad challenges since FDR and literally only a few of them were successful (on exceedingly narrow grounds). Challenging congress' commerce power is pretty much guaranteed to fail.
The case you linked to is an oddity that has nothing to do with congress' commerce power. Instead, it says that congress gave the president too much authority by saying "You can enact these codes as you please."
Dr Kynes
Well-Known Member
read it again bro, it also declares that the entire affair drastically overstepped congress' power under the commerce clause, not just the usurpation of legislative power by the executive.
I know what it says, but it's an old case, decided before FDR tried to pack the court. That's why the link you posted that gives a summary doesn't even mention the commerce clause: whatever this case says about the commerce clause was invalidated in later cases, Wickard v. Filburn (the wheat case) perhaps being the most notorious example. Today, the case you posted stands only for congress' ability to delegate legislative power to the president.
Edit: This is the link from the same source: http://www.oyez.org/cases/1940-1949/1942/1942_59/.
Rob Roy
Well-Known Member
Looks like the constitution didn't and couldn't protect jack shit. So much for "checks and balances" eh?
When I first learned of the wheat case, I figured that their self granted magical powers of wordsmithing were limitless. They've been speeding things up a bit lately. It's a matter of a few years before it crashes. The question is, what will rise from the ashes?
Dr Kynes
Well-Known Member
"But there is another objection, far-reaching and incurable, aside from any defect of unlawful delegation.
If this code had been adopted by Congress itself, and not by the President on the advice of an industrial association, it would even then be void, unless authority to adopt it is included in the grant of power 'to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States.' United States Constitution, art. 1, 8, cl. 3. "
http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=295&invol=495
this unanimous opinion clearly makes the case that even without the unconstitutional usurpation of power by the executive branch, the same rules would be invalid if drafted by the legislative branch, since they derive no power to regulate intra-state commerce from the constitution.
the age of the case has no bearing on it's validity, and there has been no amendment to the constitution making it now void, as in the case of Dredd Scott.
when i am called up before the court for refusing to be Omabacare Penaltaxed, this will be my primary defense.
Edit: and Wickard V Filburn was decided based on federal subsidies for wheat, a program entered into willingly by the appellant, and he violated the rules established by the federal subsidy program, thus he placed himself FIRMLY in the hands of the federal courts and regulation by the congress himself.
if, as is so often implied in discussion of this case, he were simply rounded up for growing wheat for use on his farm, than he would have won. instead he participated voluntarily in an Ag Dept program designed to reduce the wheat surplus which was an interstate and international issue.
he plucked himself when he planted more wheat than his subsidy allotment allowed.
Rob Roy
Well-Known Member
Penaltaxed? Damn it!!! Now there going to tax a penis? Those fuckers.
"Well, you see your honor, it's actually a verrry large clitoris"...
You cannot read supreme court cases in isolation if you want to understand what the "settled law" is. The text you quote is irrelevant because later supreme court cases contradicted it; you must read all of them together.
That's not what the case says: "But even if appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce and this irrespective of whether such effect is what might at some earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect.'" This general rule doesn't turn on federal subsidies, the person willingly entering a program, or anything else. This case says that the congress can reach local activity so long as it "exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce." Period.
How do you know I'm right? The court spent 60 years citing this case to deny every challenge made to congress' commerce clause power. All of them. Relatively recently, there have been a few cases that rejected congress' assertion of commerce power, but those cases were the exceedingly narrow and couched ones.
See Gonzalez v. Raich from 2005: "Wickard thus establishes that Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself 'commercial', in that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity." As you can see, they make no mention of anything you just ascribed to Wickard because the case didn't turn on any of the facts you referenced.
Dr Kynes
Well-Known Member
the court's opinion in wickard clearly states that his participation in the subsidy program, which was a federal program, was the crux of the issue.
they may cite it differently, but alll the cases citing wickard and schecter (at least all the ones i read, which is certainly not all of them) were dealing with interstate and international commerce, not private activity within a single state.
people entranced by expanding federal powers may SAY anything they like, but the reality remains, the court ruled on wickard due to his participation in a federal program and violation the rules thereof, and schecter was ruled based on the intrastate nature of their business.
ChesusRice
Well-Known Member
Where does it say his participation in such a program was the crux of the issue?
Dr Kynes
Well-Known Member
it was mentioned over and over again, he was receiving a subsidy, based on a limited allotment of wheat acreage, he exceeded that allotment, and thus violated the terms of the federal program.
just read the opinion of the court. they go back to the subsidy program and it's purpose over and over in detail.
the subsidy program is the axle around which the decision revolves.
There's nothing about a subsidy. The word doesn't appear. If the decision doesn't say that it turns on a specific set of facts, it doesn't turn on those facts. I looked at the opinion and I found no language that follows your suggestion. This is what they say about the law: "In July of 1940, pursuant to the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, as then amended, there were established for the appellee's 1941 crop a wheat acreage allotment of 11.1 acres and a normal yield of 20.1 bushels of wheat an acre. He was given notice of such allotment in July of 1940, before the Fall planting of his 1941 crop of wheat, and again in July of 1941, before it was harvested. He sowed, however, 23 acres, and harvested from his 11.9 acres of excess acreage 239 bushels..."
This is what they say about the claim: "It is urged that, under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, Article I, § 8, clause 3, Congress does not possess the power it has in this instance sought to exercise...Appellee says that this is a regulation of production and consumption of wheat. Such activities are, he urges, beyond the reach of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause, since they are local in character, and their effects upon interstate commerce are, at most, "indirect.""
And then we get the rule: "But even if appellee's activity be local, and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce..."
Again, see Gonzalez v. Raich for verification. That case has nothing to do with someone submitting to any kind of federal government program and they cite the rule in Wickard in finding that congress could reach the local activity in question.
Dr Kynes
Well-Known Member
from the court's decision : in wickard v fillmore ~http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/317/111/case.html
"Australia, Canada, and the United States have all undertaken various programs for the relief of growers. Such measures have been designed, in part at least, to protect the domestic price received by producers. Such plans have generally evolved towards control by the central government. [Footnote 27] In the absence of regulation, the price of wheat in the United States would be much affected by world conditions. During 1941, producers who cooperated with the Agricultural Adjustment program received an average price on the farm of about $1.16 a bushel, as compared with the world market price of 40 cents a bushel.
Differences in farming conditions, however, make these benefits mean different things to different wheat growers. There are several large areas of specialization in wheat, and the concentration on this crop reaches 27 percent of the crop land, and the average harvest runs as high as
Page 317 U. S. 127
155 acres. Except for some use of wheat as stock feed and for seed, the practice is to sell the crop for cash. Wheat from such areas constitutes the bulk of the interstate commerce therein."
"We do not agree. In its effort to control total supply, the Government gave the farmer a choice which was, of course, designed to encourage cooperation and discourage noncooperation. The farmer who planted within his allotment was, in effect, guaranteed a minimum return much above what his wheat would have brought if sold on a world market basis. Exemption from the applicability of quotas was made in favor of small producers. [Footnote 30] The farmer who produced in excess of his quota might escape penalty by delivering his wheat to the Secretary, or by storing it with the privilege of sale without penalty in a later year to fill out his quota, or irrespective of quotas if they are no longer in effect, and he could obtain a loan of 60 percent of the rate for cooperators, or about 59 cents a bushel, on so much of his wheat as would be subject to penalty if marketed. [Footnote 31] Finally, he might make other disposition of his wheat, subject to the penalty. It is agreed Page 317 U. S. 131
that, as the result of the wheat programs, he is able to market his wheat at a price "far above any world price based on the natural reaction of supply and demand." We can hardly find a denial of due process in these circumstances, particularly since it is even doubtful that appellee's burdens under the program outweigh his benefits. It is hardly lack of due process for the Government to regulate that which it subsidizes.
The amendment of May 26, 1941, is said to be invalidly retroactive in two respects: first, in that it increased the penalty from 15 cents to 49 cents a bushel; secondly, in that, by the new definition of "farm marketing excess," it subjected to the penalty wheat which had theretofore been subject to no penalty at all, i.e., wheat not "marketed" as defined in the Act."
" Wheat in excess of this quota, known as the "farm marketing excess" and declared by the amendment to be "regarded as available for marketing," was subjected to a penalty fixed at 50 percent of the basic loan rate for cooperators, [Footnote 36] or 49 cents, instead of the penalty of 15 cents which obtained at the time of planting. At the same time, there was authorized an increase in the amount of the loan which might be made to noncooperators such as the appellee upon wheat which "would be subject to penalty if marketed" from about 34 cents per bushel to about 59 cents. [Footnote 37] The entire crop was subjected by the amendment to a lien for the payment of the penalty."
this case was about a penalty for violating a voluntary program of subsidized wheat prices, by the imposition of quotas in exchange for loans and a higher than market price guarantee.
had the appellant not planted an excess acreage, or upon harvest, had not threshed his excess wheat, he would not have incurred the penalty from the subsidy program.
the subsidy program and the penalty for violating the deal are the entirety of the case.
UncleBuck
Well-Known Member
i saw many trucks specifically labeled "walmart" on the interstate today.
in fact, most walmarts tend to be located along interstates.
same as those quick-e-lube places. seems that setting those places up where people drive from state to state is a good business idea.
UncleBuck
Well-Known Member
no, we both know how to use ellipses correctly.
This is part of the factual posture, yes, but not relevant to the decision. How do you know? Because they didn't say it was relevant. The rule of the case is not phrased as "Those who voluntarily submit to government programs submit to expanded commerce clause power."
Again, want proof? Look at Gonzalez v. Raich, which involves facts totally different from these and is dismissed by citing the rule of Wicker. If you want to talk about the "settled law" and what this case means in present American constitutional law, that is where you'll find the accurate answer, not in your own analysis of this opinion.
All of this is about the due process clause, not the commerce clause.
I absolutely agree that this case is about a penalty for violating a government proscription. That doesn't mean that the decision or the rule are limited only to cases with similar facts; real lawyers certainly made that argument in the 60 years the supreme court denied every challenge to commerce clause power, and they always failed.
Again, you're inserting your own additions to the rule. The decision and the rule relate to congress' ability to reach local activities period; the precedent developed is not expressly limited to the facts you just lifted off. Had the congress not used its commerce power to allow the executive branch to issue a fine, there would have no injury and no right to challenge the congress' power.
Want more proof that I'm right? See the civil rights-related commerce cases from the 1960s. The federal government forbade hotels to engage in racial discrimination in renting rooms; a hotel argued that this exceeded the commerce power. The court answered that because the hotel had visitors from out of state it was sufficiently tied to interstate commerce to be subject to the federal law. The cases cite Wickard multiple times.
You're confusing the existence of an injury and the factual background of the case with the meaning of the precedent the case develops. The existence of the program is irrelevant; if participation in the program is the source of the injury, it is the only use of commerce power and the only basis to challenge that power. With challenge in hand, the court asks if congress can reach intrastate production activities.
If the answer is no, the answer is no. If congress doesn't have the power to involve itself in intrastate wheat production, the program at issue is unconstitutional and cannot exist. The court found that congress could involve itself in intrastate wheat production so long as it related somehow to interstate commerce, not that the farmer voluntarily submitted to something that would otherwise be constitutionally impermissible. That is the precedent, the rule I already quoted: congress can reach an intrastate activity if it is economically relevant to interstate commerce. That is what makes the law at issue in Wickard acceptable, not the fact that he submitted himself to it.
nitro harley
Well-Known Member
Evidently it didn't work out to good, sorry about your luck..
Dr Kynes
Well-Known Member
you argue like a lawyer. is there some tainted lawyer blood in your veins?
the quotes i posted are part of the OPINION of the case not excerpts from the arguments.
that the court has adop-ted the position that federal power is absolute and they can regulate how many socks i keep in my drawer is irrelevant to the constitution, logic and in fact the opinion in THIS case, not the mad insane retarded over-reach of raich which is BAD LAW.
you keep throwing around Raich as if it is some magic talisman that changes the meaning of the words and meaning of the Wickard decision, which also does NOT invalidate schecter.
you are (as the court is currently doing) using the Constitution to undermine the Constitution, and rewriting laws from the bench.
thats not how our system is supposed to work, but thats what legalism does. it's why nobody likes lawyers. they lie deceive and undermine everything the country stands for with their mealy mouthed parsing and weaseling like "No Controlling Legal Authority" and "It depends what the meaning of "IS" is..."
if you want to accept this kind of government domination of your life, then feel free to embrace it, im not having it.
Good day sir.
I Said Good Day!!
