This reads like an old pulp magazine - True Crime Stories Or The Fatman Chronicles .
I would say Trump thinks he is a mobster-in-chief or a poor man’s Sydney Greenstreet ( apologees to mr. Greenstreet )
In a letter, which was obtained by The New York Times, Haines said her office would work with the Justice Department to ensure that the assessment did not interfere with the department’s criminal investigation concerning the documents. The review will determine what intelligence sources or systems could be identified from the documents and be compromised if they fell into the wrong hands.
Haines’ letter, dated Friday, was reported earlier by Politico. It came after the leaders of the Intelligence and Oversight Committees asked her on Aug. 13 to conduct an “immediate review and damage assessment” in the wake of the FBI’s search of Mar-a-Lago, during which federal agents recovered 11 sets of classified documents.
The Senate Intelligence Committee also asked for a damage assessment, according to the panel’s chair, Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va., who said the request had been bipartisan.
On Friday, the Justice Department released a redacted version of the affidavit used to obtain the search warrant for Mar-a-Lago. That document included the revelation that Trump had retained highly classified material after leaving office, including documents related to the use of “
clandestine human sources” in intelligence gathering.
Reps. Adam B. Schiff, D-Calif., the chair of the Intelligence Committee, and Carolyn B. Maloney, D-N.Y., the chair of the Oversight Committee, issued an approving statement in response to Haines’ letter.
“The DOJ affidavit, partially unsealed yesterday, affirms our grave concern that among the documents stored at Mar-a-Lago were those that could endanger human sources,” the lawmakers said in their statement.
Clandestine human intelligence is intelligence collected from human sources using clandestine
espionage methods. These sources consist of people working in a variety of roles within the intelligence community. Examples include the quintessential
spy (known by professionals as an
asset or
agent), who collects intelligence; couriers and related personnel, who handle an intelligence organization's (ideally) secure communications; and support personnel, such as
access agents, who may arrange the contact between the potential spy and the case officer who recruits them. The recruiter and supervising agent may not necessarily be the same individual. Large espionage networks may be composed of multiple levels of spies, support personnel, and supervisors. Espionage networks are typically organized as a
cell system, in which each clandestine operator knows only the people in his own cell, perhaps the external case officer, and an emergency method (which may not necessarily involve another person) to contact higher levels if the case officer or cell leader is captured, but has no knowledge of people in other cells. This cellular organization is a form of
compartmentalisation, which is an important tactic for controlling access to information, used in order to diminish the risk of discovery of the network or the release of sensitive information.
The Fat Man
